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Principia. At the … For readers of that day, it was this deductive, mathematical aspect that was the great achievement. Truesdell, Walras's early reading consolidated his boundless admiration for Newtonian astronomy and the solid edifice of classical mechanics, which he regarded as unequaled models of
In political economy, Ricardo and James Mill compared the certainty of the propositions (Halévy, 1960 p. 494) The impression that one could build price theory up from basics in the image of Euclid was much more important than commitment to any particular proposed formalization. The moral of the story is simply this: it takes a new theory, and not just the destructive exposure of assumptions or the collection of new facts, to beat an old theory. (Blaug, 1998 p. 703) At present standard economics is not firmly enough based on positive knowledge of economically relevant human behavior. As Binmore recapitulates:
I do not understand why we cannot just accept that the empirical evidence shows that traditional economics works well in some situations and not at all in othersand that the interesting cases for current research all lie somewhere in between.
(Binmore, 2008 p. 249); see also (Kahneman, 1996) , (Sugden, 1991) , (Stiglitz, 1991) The failure of microeconomic theory to uncover laws of human behavior is due to its wrongly assuming that these laws will trade in desires, beliefs or their cognates.
And the system of propositions about markets and economies that economist have constructed on the basis of its assumptions about human behavior is deprived of improving explanatory and predictive power because its assumptions cannot be improved in a way that transmits improved precision to their consequences. (Rosenberg, 1994a p. 224) If one shares the outlook that 'anything based on this mock-up is unlikely to fly' (Hahn, 1981 (Hahn, p. 1036 ) then the cognitive investment decision between standard economics and the exploration of alternative approaches is a straightforward one 3 . The present treatise makes the attempt to reconstruct a coherent formal superstructure on a non-behavioral foundation. When the market economy is conceived as a complex maze of structural and behavioral interdependencies then the probability of eventually finding some strong regularity is greater in the structural than in the behavioral domain. And since the individual 'neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it ' (Smith, 2008 ' (Smith, /1776 there is a sizeable a priori probability that the beneficial operations of the invisible hand will have the character of structural interdependencies, which of course are not apparent to the naked eye but have to be abstracted from readily accessible phenomena on the surface. This analytical venture requires a unique coordinate system of primitive concepts to start with. This framework of concepts is formalized by a set of axioms 4 .
Axiomatization is, again, a serious issue in economics since von Neumann, Debreu, Arrow and Hahn (Mirowski, 2002 pp. 104-113, 303, 408-409) , (Weintraub, 1998) , (Leonhard, 1995 pp. 755-756) , (Ingrao, et al., 1990) and it is supposed to guarantee the coherence and consistency of all parts of a theoretical edifice. Axiomatization alone, however, leads merely to 'rigorous rubbish' (Clower, 1994 p. 409) The degree of formalization was certainly not up to present-day set-theoretical standards but there can be no doubt that the axiomatic method has been the crucial element of theoretical economics since Adam Smith:
His [Smith's] method is always the method of Newton, which we have already seen applied to psychology and morals: to attain, by generalization, certain simple truths, from which it will be possible to reconstruct, synthetically, the world of experience.
(Halévy, 1960 pp. 100, 494); see also (Hollander, 1977) , (Redman, 1993 p. 98) This, however, does not imply that Mill's behavioral axiom is the only or the best point of departure or, for that matter, that axiomatization is at all productively applicable to human behavior 6 . With regard to the first concern, the appropriateness of the set of basic concepts, Cournot was quite explicit and stupendously clairvoyant:
The abstract idea of wealth or value in exchange (…) must be carefully distinguished from accessory ideas of utility, scarcity and suitability to the needs and enjoyment of mankind (…). These ideas are variable, and by nature indeterminate and consequently ill suited for the foundation of a scientific theory (…). Cournot 1897, quoted in (Mirowski, 1995 p. 208 ); see also (Ingrao, et al., 1990 pp. 38, 41, 47, 81) The second concern, the applicability of the hypothetico-deductive method to human behavior in the economic realm, led around 1890 to the fierce controversy known as
Methodenstreit (Hodgson, 2001 pp. 93-94) , (Hands, 1993 pp. 39-49, 81) , (GeorgescuRoegen, 1971 pp. 325, 342) . Although the Historical School had valid arguments it was eventually split off from the mainstream whose proponents preferred to look to the triumphant physical sciences for methodological inspiration 7 . Hahn summarized the effect of the ensuing conceptual monoculture a century later:
History dependence stares us in the face (…), but it is not the stuff of pure theory.
(Hahn, 1991 p. 48)
The stance taken in this treatise is a pragmatic one. Formalisation was not to be merely a mechanical check on the integrity of scientific reasoning, but through the process of axiomatisation, mathematics was to be an engine of discovery. (Weintraub, 1998 (Weintraub, p. 1844 ); see also (Suppes, 1968 p. 653) The proper working of this engine is vitally dependent on the coextensive framework of concepts. Axiomatization is not exempt from the trivial rule 'garbage in, garbage out' (Blatt, 1983 p. 167) 9 . Hence, it is the predominantly intuitive ensemble of primitive concepts that is crucial and not formalization per se (Woo, 1986 p. 66 This gives one a clear-cut choice: 1) Forget about axiomatization and build mathematical models instead (Niehans, 1994 pp. 313-317) , each conveniently endowed with its own basic assumptions. 2) Scale down vacuous theory and rely first on down-toearth empirical research (von Neumann, et al., 2007 (von Neumann, et al., /1944 13 . 3) Restart with a new set of axioms.
Choosing the first option makes economics a pile of incoherent and inconclusive partial models (Morishima, 1984 p. 58 ) and involves some mild schizophrenia because the mathematics used derives its merits straight from being axiomatized. Either way, the multiplication of models is a 'good game' (Hicks) but lacking a common formal ground the only remaining commonality defining the subject matter is a passepartout tool, the calculus of constrained optimization 14 . The second option produces a relatively small number of historical snapshots that can stand for themselves yet need a theoretical framework for generalization (Feyerabend, 2002 p. 27) . The third option is at all times worth a trial according to J. S. Mill's principle of proliferation (Feyerabend, 1995 pp. 139-143) 15 .
The goal of the present treatise is to establish a formalism of maximum structural simplicity and generality. We start with an axiom set that is free of any behavioral specifications and subsequently approach the complexity of the real world by a process of consistent differentiation, that is, by applying the method of decreasing abstraction (Klant, 1988 p. 90) . While progressing from the big picture to the details the coherence of whole and parts is maintained at every level of differentiation. It has to be shown that on the new axiomatic foundation a general theory in the strict sense can be reconstructed.
With a minimum expense of words Figure 1 summarizes that the present treatise is about the switch of the unifying principle from the behavioral axioms represented by homo economicus to structural axioms.
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Figure 1 Switch of the Unifying Principle
It should therefore cause no great surprise that the terminology used in the following necessarily differs to some extent from the subjective-marginalistic terminology. The phenomena to be studied, naturally, are the same 16 . However, since the perspective is structure-centric instead of behavior-centric and since the configuration of formal premises is entirely new, the following inquiry leads in some relevant cases to new insights and conclusions.
An axiomatic approach provides an array of consistent logical conclusions. It neither offers a political philosophy nor a finished proposal how to fix the most pressing economic problem, whatever it is at the moment 17 . As a piece of pure theory the present treatise first of all calls for a comparison of the formal conclusions with real world events.
For this purpose a wide range of rather specific propositions is provided in the following.
Viner has made the case for axiomatization in one plain sentence:
To Plato's question, "Granted that there are means of reasoning from premises to conclusions, who has the privilege of choosing the premises?" the correct answer, I
presume, is that anyone has this privilege who wishes to exercise it, but that everyone else has the privilege of deciding for himself what significance to attach to the conclusions, and that somewhere there lies the responsibility, through the choice of the appropriate premises, to see to it that judgment, information, and perhaps even faith, hope and charity, wield their due influence on the nature of economic thought. (Viner, 1963 p. 12)
Implicit World Views
"Life is short. Nature is niggardly. Our fellows have other objectives ", Robbins (1935 p.
13) was quite explicit about his ontological stance. It is widely admitted that each theoretical endeavor is influenced by the researcher's implicit world view (Suppe, 1977 pp. 217-221), (Fleck, 1980 (Fleck, /1935 . These subjective preconceptions turn up as selfevident characteristics of the natural order (Klant, 1988) . Robbins distilled his valuecharged preconception about the human condition into the neutral notions of choice, scarcity, and competition. The original meaning of these concepts became further blurred with progressive formalization but it is invariably present as a subtext in the economic discourse.
Ontology is educated guesswork about what is truly real or merely accidental or even illusory (Mäki, 2001) , (Searle, 1995) , (Lawson, 1994) . Hence the contention that Nature is niggardly would not be of any importance were it not for the fact that ontology, however trivial 18 , is crucial for the acceptance or rejection of theories (Mäki, 2001 p. 9).
Einstein did not come to terms with quantum theory because of his deterministic ontology (Atmanspacher, 2002 p. 50) and not because he regarded quantum theory as logically deficient.
Ontology meanders, in interaction with the distinct scientific subfields 19 , between antipodes like: form-substance, being-becoming, determinism-randomness, order-chaos, causality-finality, ends-means, indestructibility-degradation, unity-diversity, equilibrium-process, atomistic-organistic, quantitative-qualitative, continuous-discrete, natural-social, rational-emotional, cooperative-competitive, finite-infinite, perfect (Supreme Being)-corrupt (human being), and so on.
That the ontological profile of standard economics closely resembles that of classical physics (Mirowski, 1995) , (Ingrao, et al., 1990 pp. 33-37) and is therefore misleading in the domain of economics has been an ongoing critique since Walras and Jevons started their extensive borrowing from the hard sciences (Cohen, 1994 p. 79) .
It has been repeatedly suggested that scientists come ontologically in two types:
Platonists and Heraclitians. The first type is comfortable with stasis and order and sees the world basically in equilibrium. The second type likes process and change and sees the world in intermittent continuous and discontinuous flux (Waldrop, 1993 pp. 334-335) .
There is, though, somewhat more to ontology than this simplistic binary scheme covers.
The Durkheim-Mauss-Douglas Thesis asserts: On the other hand it has been observed:
In a real sense Darwin produced a theory of proximal cause, evolution by natural selection, designed to exorcise the specter of supernatural design. In doing so, he moved biology into a Newtonian framework. (Brooks, et al., 1986 p. x); see also (Gingerezer, et al., 1997 p. 136) , (Bannister, 1979 p. 26) 22
The interlinking explanandum of economics is the phenomenon of accelerated 'technophysico evolution' (Fogel, 1999 p. 2), (Day, 2008 ) that goes along with an even faster development of the financial sphere. In the present treatise the adjective evolutionary 23 embraces five specific tenets with regard to the subject matter of economics:
-The money economy is -ontologically -the real economy.
-The economy operates at the margin of time.
-The basic systemic characteristics are: change, chance, and variety 24 .
-Neither the agent nor the theoretical economist knows that the sun will rise tomorrow 25 .
-The principle of hierarchical ontological consistency applies. A rather straightforward application of this principle asserts: since the unsurpassable speed of light is finite, the speed of economic agent's action and reaction is even more finite; therefore the behavioral assumption of simultaneous mutual adaptation is pointless, even in pure as-if models.
Hierarchical ontological consistency is independent of formal consistency. The opaque interaction between advanced formalization and ontology has been elucidated by Woo:
By the time a sophisticated logical system is build up, it is no longer easy to relax
[the] originally instrumental but now ontological assumptions on a one-by-one basis, because the relaxed assumptions (even those of a more realist kind), still have to be blended into the rest of the system in order to derive new theorems. This, the system can hardly escape being contaminated by the unreal ontology unwittingly formed in the rest of the system, an ontology that no longer has any conceivable counterpart in reality (…). (Woo, 1992 p. 37), original emphasis
The multilayer ontological underworld is not a harmless virtual reality. It imparts legitimacy and it busily manufactures insiders and outsiders 26 . The ontological stance is pre-theoretical but neither neutral nor useless because it implicitly determines the positive and negative heuristics of a research program. In economics, the evolution paradigm denies the ontological legitimacy of the equilibrium paradigm.
Comprehensibility and Compressibility
Theory has aptly been compared to a map that reduces the overwhelming complexity of the real thing to manageable proportions. As a first step to a useful map naïve empiricism translates the real thing into commonplace economics (Niehans, 1994 p. 15) which asserts:
-Successive units of a commodity are less and less urgently needed. (…) -Abundance makes prices fall a scarcity makes them rise (…).
-A decline in price stimulates demand but reduces supply (…).
-Higher fertility and better location result in higher land rent.
-An increase in the money supply raises prices.
-Voluntary exchange is advantageous to both parties.
-Trade occurs because different regions have different natural endowments (…).
The salient trait of this pre-theoretical raw material is that it reflects a proximal glance at a fairly developed economy with prices, rent, and money, which is historically located somewhere between a pure barter economy and a globalized economy:
For the history of economic science, the concept of commonplace economics is useful mainly as a benchmark from which analytical achievement can be measured.
It marks the zero point of scientific progress. (Niehans, 1994 p. 15)
What we need, then, is a corresponding analytical zero point. The crucial requirement thereby is that this point must embrace the whole economy. To insist on this requirement is the distinguishing merit of general equilibrium theory in comparison to the Marshallian approach that has to protect its open flanks with ceteris paribus 27 . This analytical expedient is unwarranted because circular interdependencies are the defining characteristic of the economy. Therefore no partial approach of any kind will do in the long run. Methodologically partial analysis has the serious drawback that it almost certainly leads to the fallacy of composition.
The task is to create a map of the whole economy without firsthand experience because
The Economy is invisible and intangible. That is, one has to leap from commonplace economics to an extremely abstract set of basic propositions about the economy as a whole 28 . This set has to reduce the vast complexity of the real thing to almost nothing.
From this almost-nothingness the real world complexity then has to be logically reconstructed. This requires the cumulative introduction of more specific assumptions and historical contingencies. The consequence of which can be made clear with an analogy to physics. The law of gravitation enables a fairly good prediction of a cannonball's parabolic trajectory but does not help much with a flying feather that is more exposed to the innumerable contingencies of the moment. It is obvious, however, that this kind of complexity is altogether independent from the simple general laws of motion. Hence the complexities of real life do not a priori preclude the simplicity of theory. Admittedly, they severely hamper the straightforward application of the theory in the 'abyss of disorder' (Quesnay). For individual practical purposes commonplace economics is inductively true and sufficient. By the same token is Aristotle's commonplace physics still empirically valid for all who remain close to the earth's surface (Feyerabend, 1995 pp. 176-181) and who do not care about Galileo's acrimonious refutation of parochial realism. Yet, theory aims at generality 29 .
It may well turn out, though, that it is impossible to analytically reduce the complexity of the whole economy. In this case a faithful description and interpretation of the state of affairs by ideal types is the alternative to axiomatization. Whether it is possible to capture the essence of a money economy with a few axioms is unknowable in advance yet we may find it out with successive trials:
Whether an axiom is or is not valid can be ascertained either through direct experimentation or by verification through the result of observations, or, if such a thing is impossible, the correctness of the axiom can be judged through the indirect method of verifying the laws which proceed from the axiom by observation or experimentation. (If the axiom is deemed to be incorrect it must be modified or instead a correct axiom must be found.) (Morishima, 1984 p. 53) Contradicting Morgenstern's credo 'I believe that it is quite possible to axiomatize economics. ' (Ingrao, et al., 1990 p. 193) , it has been argued more than once that this approach is futile in principle:
(…) theory means a logical filing of all extant knowledge in some particular domain such that every known proposition be either contained in the logical foundation or deducible from it. That such a filing has the unique merit of affording comprehensibility is a leitmotiv inherited from Aristotle. However, hardly any attention has been paid to the fact that there can be no comprehensibility without the compressibility of extant knowledge into only a relatively few ω-propositions. 
Rethinking the Basics
The goal is to better understand how the economy generates favorable conditions for its accelerated self-transformation. The analytical zero point for the quest is given with the structural axiom set in sections 2.1 and 2.3. The axioms that contain ten measurable variables constitute an evolving consumption economy. The route then leads quite lineally towards the general axiomatic model in section 14. Since the axiomatic variables are measurable, the logical implications have the format of 'laws of algebra ' (Shaik, 1980) that have an empirical counterpart.
The behavioral building block, the propensity function, is introduced in section 2.4.
This general equation compactifies all logical variants from uncertainty to determinism and from it follows the drifting economy as the minimalistic evolutionary benchmark process. The market outcomes of the pure random processes are analyzed in section 4 and the distinction between stochastic and deterministic supersymmetry on the one hand and behavioral equilibrium on the other is exemplified. It is shown that the microeconomic details of a behavioral equilibrium or disequilibrium can be readily mapped onto the elementary axiom set. This compactification is then also carried out for an arbitrary number of periods.
In section 5 the development of real and nominal stocks including the quantity of money is directly derived from the axiom set.
Human behavior is epitomized by a new economic man and his multidimensional bundle of signum functions. The signum function is introduced in section 6 and first applied to analyze the clearing of the product market and the balancing of the household sector's budget with a minimum of behavioral assumptions. The signum function, which determines the directionality of the propensity function, is derived as the product of the information and the action function. In section 6.1, 6.4, and 6.5 it is demonstrated for the product market how directed randomness leads to stochastic stability and optimality in a random environment.
Section 7 is devoted to the introduction of the axioms of profit and saving and the consistent derivation of net worth. The substantial conceptual differences with standard profit theory are elaborated at length. Standard profit theory needs neither empirical nor logical falsification because it is known to be incoherent. What is actually needed is a consistent alternative, which is provided by the structural axiom set.
In section 8 the behavioral and structural interplay is explored in detail in order to specify the favorable conditions that are indispensable for the proper functioning of the market economy. In this straightforward mechanical analysis the concepts of employment multiplier and price multiplier are put to work. It turns out that there exists a significant algebraic relation between the employment multiplier and the original Phillips curve.
The extended axiomatic base is the formal precondition for the logical emergence of new markets: the secondary commodity market and the various financial markets that are dealt with in section 9. In this context, as in others, we are led to the conclusion that there is no such thing as a generic market.
The distribution of output between the wage earners and the receivers of distributed profits and the mechanism of redistribution is analyzed in section 10 together with the distribution of profits between firms. It is shown that the distribution of output does not depend on a well-behaved production function or on diminishing returns.
Applying the method of rational reconstruction an account is given in section 11 of how the initial economy and the supporting institutions come into being by the rational choice of individuals. The analytical aim is to set the development of the economy in motion from initial conditions that are entirely transparent and to oversee without difficulty. Nonhuman production factors and an evolutionary analogue to the production function are added and then formally compactified, i.e., mapped onto the axiom set.
With the consistent integration of the labor market in sections 12 the basic two-market system is completed and the probability of full employment is formally established. The crucial conditions that are conductive to virtuous feedback loops are discussed in section 12.5.
In section 13 the formal system is completed and closed. Given the signum functions of The formal differentiation of the axiom set is carried out for an arbitrary number of firms in section 14. In this main part the structural value theorem is derived and applied first to two firms that produce different consumption goods and then to the central bank and the land agency. The harmonic production structure is defined as the perfect congruence of the allocation of labor input and the partitioning of consumption expenditures between several firms. An important property of the harmonic structure is the equality of profit ratios if the average wage rates in two firms are equal. For the special case of market clearing and budget balancing in one period the optimal partitioning of total expenditures can be formally connected to the marginal rate of substitution. The harmonic structure allows for the determination of the rate of interest and of the ratio of the lease price for land to the product price. The classical notions of factor income and distribution are restated in structural axiomatic terms to clarify fundamental differences and to pinpoint the interconnection of productivity differentials, institutional settings, choice, and distribution.
The household sector is differentiated in section 15 and the analysis of the direct lenderborrower relationship leads to the formal integration of liquidity, time preference, risk, and insurance.
At germane junctures the formal interfaces to established approaches are highlighted. In some cases it can be demonstrated immediately that an established approach is a limiting case of the general axiomatic model. For the Keynesian approach this is done at length in section 16. The structural axiomatic approach makes it possible to precisely locate the conceptual and logical flaws of the Keynesian formalism. The analysis of the investment cycle is then carried further in section 17. The focus is on the interrelation of profit and the real rate of interest, i.e., on the interrelation of the nominal side and the productivity effect of investment. We arrive at the general result that the structural stability of the economic system is vitally dependent on prolonged asymmetric growth.
Section 18 highlights the long term conditions for a thriving market economy in structural axiomatic terms. The clues of the previous investigation are resumed and brought to the conclusion that there are two invisible hands, the right one giving and the left one taking, and that we have in the past mostly felt the right one.
Section 19 concludes.
The simulation details of the evolving money economy are gathered and illustrated in the appendix. A link for the download of the Excel simulation file is provided in section 21.1.
In his famous Science and Method Henri Poincaré gave a felicitous characterization of the axiomatic enterprise:
The essential thing is to learn to reason with the axioms once admitted. Uncle
Sarcey, who loved to repeat himself, often said that the audience at a theatre willingly accepts all the postulates imposed at the start, but that once the curtain has gone up it becomes inexorable on the score of logic. Well, it is just the same in mathematics. (Poincaré, 2007 (Poincaré, /1914 As it happens, it is just the same in economics.
Notes
1 For different aspects see as a small historical selection: (Stiglitz, 2010), (Akerlof, et al., 2009 ), (Ackerman, 2004 , (Kanth, 2004) , (Boland, 2003) , (Downward, et al., 2002) , (Chick, et al., 2001) , (Backhouse, 1998) , (Lawson, 1997) , (Perelman, 1996) , (Heilbroner, et al., 1995) , (Mirowski, 1995) , (Clower, 1994) , (Ormerod, 1994) , (Blaug, 1992) , (Morishima, 1991) , (Stiglitz, 1991) , (Wiseman, 1991) , (Ansari, 1991) , (Kirman, 1989) , (Arouh, 1987) , (Minsky, 2008 (Minsky, /1986 , (O'Driscoll, et al., 1985) , (Wiles, et al., 1984) , (Bell, et al., 1981) , (Eichner, 1983) , (Harcourt, 1972) , (Hunt, et al., 1972) , (Kaldor, 1972) , (Phelps Brown, 1972) , (Shackle, 1972) , (Ward, 1972) , (Worswick, 1972) , (GeorgescuRoegen, 1971) , (Kornai, 1971) , (Boulding, 1970) . Roughly, the arguments follows these main strands: -'Thousands upon thousands of scholars, as well as thousands of statesmen and men of affairs, have contributed their efforts to the attempt to understand the course of events of the economic world. And today this field of investigation is being cultivated more extensively, than ever before. How is it, then, that in all these years, and with all the undoubted talent that has been lavished upon it, the subject of economics has advanced so little?' (Schoeffler, 1955 p. 2) -'I am talking about the evident bankruptcy of economic theory which for the second time has nothing to say on the questions that, to everyone except economists, appear to be most in need of an answer.' (Robinson, 1972 p. 9) -'Now, at any rate, we have an explanation for why the assumptions of economic theory about individual action have not been improved, corrected, sharpened, specified, or conditioned in ways that would improve the predictive power of the theory. None of these things have been done by economists because they cannot be done. The intentional of the fundamental explanatory variables of economic theory prohibits such improvement.' (Rosenberg, 1992 p. 149); 'The predictive weakness of theories couched in intensional vocabulary do not correlate in a manageable way with the vocabulary of other successful scientific theories; they do nor divide 'nature at the joints'; (…).' (Rosenberg, 1994a p. 224), for comments see (Hands, 2001 pp. 334-341) -'Thus many are inclined to blame inappropriate copying of physics for the willingness of neoclassicals to tolerate bizarrely unrealistic assumptions and to place everything historical, cultural, institutional, and even psychological outside the framework of economic analysis.' (Porter, 1994 p. 128) -'None of these scientist-critics aimed to deny the legitimacy of theory, not even in political economy. Nor did they commonly denounce a premature use of mathematics. They objected, rather, to "loose" theorizing. The precision and rigor of quantitative methods were held up as a cure for this looseness.' (Porter, 1994 p. 130) -'Knight lamented that there are many members of the economic profession who are "mathematicians first and economists afterwards." The situation since Knight's time has become much worse. There are endeavors that now pass for the most desirable kind of economic contributions although they are just plain mathematical exercises, not only without any economic substance but also without mathematical value. Their authors are not something first and something else afterwards; they are neither mathematicians nor economists.' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979 p. 317) -'General Equilibrium Theory regarded by many as the summum of the 'grand neoclassical synthesis' has throughout its development been systematically attacked by a wide variety of critics from many different angles. Yet, curiously, these criticisms have been largely ineffective and it would not be unfair to say that this theory still furnishes the basic foundations of what many are pleased to call 'mainstream economics'. Indeed such theory as is used by practical men to justify their economic recommendations is derived from this underlying framework, albeit with unwarranted appendages. There seems to be a quiet confidence in the profession that we are moving, if only slowly, towards a more scientific basis for economics. (…) Paradoxically many of those who have contributed much to the development of general equilibrium theory are less complacent.' (Kirman, 1989 p. 126) -'Arrow said that neoclassical economics has three "scandals" to resolve: its inability to integrate micro-and macroeconomics, its nonincorporation of imperfect competition, and its nonincorporation of transaction costs, which are essential both to the theory of money and to asset holding theory in general.' (Koo, 2009 p. 295) -'As will become evident, there is more agreement on the defects of orthodox theory than there is on what theory is to replace it: but all agreed that the point of the criticism is to clear the ground for construction.' (Nell, 1980 p. 1) -'(…) if you think you can do better with a non-neoclassical model (…), then you are quite welcome to try.' (Boland, 1992 p. 19) -'If one calls those individuals working in the field of microeconomic foundations of Keynesian economics Keynesian-economic theorist, then, as Hahn has said, these 'Keynesians were not much better'.' (Morishima, 1984 p. 57) -'These, then (abstractions, parsimony, axioms, economic determinacy) surely are the "Ricardian Vices" to which we are all heirs; it is these that divert and corrupt our energies.' (Wiles, 1979 p. 164) -'Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, what we presently possess by way of so-called pure economic theory is objectively indistinguishable from what the physicist Richard Feynman, in an unflattering sketch of nonsense "science," called "cargo cult science".' (Clower, 1994 p. 809) -'We should also like to underline Debreu's effective reference to Bacon when he says that "citius emergit veritas ex errore quam ex confusione." It would be a mistake to lower the level of analysis and clarification. The only way possible is a thorough reexamination of the theory's basic hypotheses, i.e., a true paradigmatic revolution.' (Ingrao, et al., 1990 p. 362), original emphasis -'Gary Becker has suggested that a substantial resistance to the acceptance of new ideas by scientists can be explained by two familiar economic concepts. One is the concept of specific human capital: the established scholar possesses a valuable capital asset in his command over a particular body of knowledge. That capital would be reduced if his knowledge were made obsolete by the general acceptance of a new theory. Hence, established scholars should, in their own self-interest, attack new theories, possibly even more than they do in the absence of joint action. The second concept is risk aversion, which leads young scholars to prefer mastery of established theories to seeking radically different theories. Scientific innovators, like adventurers in general, are probably not averse to risk, but for the mass of scholars in a discipline, risk aversion is a strong basis for scientific conservatism. ' (Stigler, 1983 p. 538) 2 'Just as one of the great contributions of twentieth-century neoclassical economics was to make clear why considerations which they had excluded from their analyses -such as information and transactions costs -simply had to be brought into the analysis, so too one of the central contributions of game theory has been to make it clear that the 'rational' actor model is not only descriptively inaccurate (as earlier economists had charged), but internally incomplete and/or inconsistent (…). The hope of game theory that some simple version of rationality could lead to well-defined, let alone reasonable, predictions of behaviour has been dashed. Game theorists have increasingly relied in their analyses on 'small' degrees of irrationality, while at the same time showing that the exact nature of the equilibrium depends precisely on the nature of these small irrationalities (…). This research makes it clear (if it was not already so) that economists must study how individuals actually behave, whether that conforms to some economists' preconception of rationality or not. ' (Stiglitz, 1991 p. 138) 3 '(…) we may say that the long-lasting success of our categories and the omnipresence of a certain point of view is not a sign of excellence or an indication that the truth or part of the truth has at last been found. It is, rather, the indication of a failure of reason to find suitable alternatives which might be used to transcend an accidental intermediate stage of our knowledge. ' (Feyerabend, 2004 p. 72) , original emphasis 4 'The often heard rule that concepts are to be defined before they are used in a discussion is much too simple minded pre-Hilbertian. The only way to arrive at coherent languages is to set up axiomatic systems implicitly defining the basic concepts. (Schmiechen, 2009 p. 344) 5 'As we shall see, general economic equilibrium theory originated and developed in the context of a project put forward in varying forms by different scholars to repeat Newton's titanic achievement -i.e., the fulfillment of Galileo's program for a quantitative (mathematical) study of physical processes -in the field of the social sciences.' (Ingrao, et al., 1990 pp. 33-34) , original emphasis 6 'Not that any political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but because this is the mode in which science must necessarily proceed. ' (Mill, 2004 ' (Mill, /1844 'In political economy for instance, empirical laws of human nature are tacitly assumed by English thinkers, which are calculated only for Great Britain and the United States.' (Mill, 2006 (Mill, /1843 7 'A picture of science has developed since the Renaissance, or perhaps more precisely since the seventeenth century that was formed entirely by mathematics and physics. Philosophers from Bacon and Descartes to Locke and Kant were of the same opinion as the physical scientists from Galileo and Newton to Lavoisier and Laplace, that it should be the ideal of science to propose mathematically formulated theories that are based on universal laws. Proof and the capacity for exact prediction were considered the yardsticks for the quality of a scientific explanation. (…) The theoreticians of science prior to 1859 were unable to incorporate history into the physical sciences. One could not experiment with it, and one could reconstruct it only by indirect inference. How could this be reconciled with the objectivity of science? There was no room for history in the classical philosophy of science from the Vienna positivists to Hempel-Oppenheim and Nagel. And this was even true for Karl Popper until the end of the 1970s. There can be no doubt, as was shown by Ghiselin (…), Mayr (…), and Gould (…), that Darwin had founded a new methodology, the methodology of the historical sciences. ' (Mayr, 1991 pp. 134-135) 8 'The sense of formalization I shall use in the subsequent discussion is just that of a standard set-theoretical formulation. ' (Suppes, 1968 p. 653) . 'This tendency to identify mathematics with formalism rather than formulas became all the more dominant in the 1930s and 1940s, when general equilibrium theory was established as the most prestigious research field in the economic discipline.' (Porter, 1994 p. 159) It is important to note that the present treatise rests on the conviction that economics as applied axiomatics may well start above the set-theoretical level. In this sense we axiomatize but do not formalize. 'Thus not all axiomatic theories need to be phrased in terms of set theory but much more conveniently and intelligibly rather in terms of some advanced mathematical structures.' (Schmiechen, 2009 p. 367) 'Under the influence of recent mathematical fashion, some authors have developed axiomatic formulations of mechanics using set theory. But set theory is not the right mathematical tool because it is too general. Consequently, theorems and proofs in this approach are inordinately unwieldy. ' Hestens, quoted in (Schmiechen, 2009 p. 368) 9 'Then there are axioms (everyone maximizes his profits; resource allocation is the only economic problem): these are not known in other sciences. An axiom (…) is only a premise one is not allowed to question, dressed up as something grand. But it is precisely the scientist's duty to question everything! Our crime is not that we use a priori reasoning, for often we can use nothing else, but that we push the a priori all the way up to the axiom. "Axiom" is, of course, a polite but impressive-sounding word for a "sacred proposition." The concept gives us the impression that it is worthwhile to erect vast superstructures of deduction on virtually no fact, and this has now become a deep-rooted tradition. ' (Wiles, 1979 p. 163) , original emphasis To maintain that there is something sacred about axioms is a popular misunderstanding. Quite the contrary is true: non-Euclidean geometry is the outcome of challenging Euclid's 5 th postulate.
10 General equilibrium theory did not found much acceptance among physicists, engineers, and mathematicians because of its lack of empirical content: '(…) it was in part because they had been brought up to think even less of theory without measurement than of measurement without theory. ' (Porter, 1994 p. 161) 'Walras approached Poincaré for his approval. (…) But Poincaré was devoutly committed to applied mathematics and did not fail to notice that utility is a nonmeasurable magnitude. (…) He also wondered about the premises of Walras's mathematics: It might be reasonable, as a first approximation, to regard men as completely self-interested, but the assumption of perfect foreknowledge "perhaps requires a certain reserve." ' (Porter, 1994 p. 154) 11 'Now the rationality principle, which in the social sciences plays a role somewhat analogous to the universal laws of the natural sciences, is false, and if in addition the situational models are also false, then both the constituent elements of social theory are false. ' (Popper, 1994 p. 173) 12 Cournot is here meant to act as a symbolic representative of a larger and sometimes quite radical group: 'A remarkable discussion has been lately going on in the revues and journals concerning the logical method of the science, touching even the question whether there exists such a science at all. Attention was drawn to the matter by Mr. T. E. Cliffe Leslie's remarkable article "On the Philosophical Method of Political Economy," in which he endeavours to dissipate the deductive science of Ricardo. Mr. W. T. Thornton's writings have a somewhat similar tendency. (…) Many would be glad if the supposed science collapsed altogether, and became a matter of history, like astrology, alchemy, and the occult sciences generally. (…) But as regards the fate of the deductive method, I disagree altogether with my friend Mr. Leslie; he is in favor of simple deletion; I am for thorough reform and reconstruction. ' (Jevons, 2006 ' (Jevons, /1911 13 'Next, the empirical background of economic science is definitively inadequate. Our knowledge of the relevant facts of economics is incomparably smaller than that commanded in physics at the time when the mathematization of that subject was achieved. (…) It is due to the combination of the above mentioned circumstances that mathematical economics has not achieved very much. ' (von Neumann, et al., 2007 ' (von Neumann, et al., /1944 14 'Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.' (Robbins, 1935 p. 16) . 'This definition, while it is still popular in introductory textbooks, is really a definition that reduces all of economics to a particular kind of microeconomics; (…). '(Hands, 2001 p. 36 ) 'Yet, in spite of these methodological triumphs, the subject does not bear all the hallmarks of some of the other sciences. Most strikingly, while economists of many persuasions may agree about the tools to be employed, there is no agreement about the basic economic model for describing the economy: while in many circles, the competitive model, with perfectly informed agents, rational consumers and value maximising firms, is believed to provide the foundations for understanding both the aggregative behaviour of the economy and its components, in other circles, that model is viewed with some circumspection. Evidently, the tools are not strong enough to discriminate among fundamentally different hypotheses, or at least not strong enough to overcome differences in prior beliefs, beliefs which are often influenced by ideological concerns.' (Stiglitz, 1991 p. 134) In the present treatise the subject matter is delineated by the structural axiom set and the propensity function. Constrained optimization is thereby not excluded but regarded as a limiting case. 15 See also Popper's conjectures and refutations (Popper, 1981 p. 53 ). Mill's proliferation or Popper's conjectures differ in substance from the multiplication of models: 'Some fields of economics consist mainly of interesting possibilities. The hundredth possible world of international trade theory gives the impression of an allegorical poesy gone wacko. ' (McCloskey, 1990 p. 31) 16 'And similarly in economic theory, certain results (…) may be known already. Yet it is of interest to derive them again from an exact theory. The same could and should be said concerning practically all established economic theorems. ' (von Neumann, et al., 2007 ' (von Neumann, et al., /1944 17 'However much economists may evoke their purity, they want to change the world. They want to contribute to the solution of urgent practical problems. (…) Of course, they also pursue the consistency of the theories they make, for he who contradicts himself proves nothing.' (Klant, 1988 pp. 112-113) , original emphasis Unfortunately, economists have entangled themselves in an idiosyncratic version of the Epimenides paradox. From the behavioral axiom that all rational agents promote their self-interest follows that whatever proposal economists make must either be in the selfinterest of economists or irrational. Apart from this logical trap scientific credibility has become a major problem. 'Changing paradigms is not easy. Too many have invested too much in the wrong models. Like the Ptolemaic attempts to preserve earth-centric views of the universe, there will be heroic efforts to add complexities and refinements to the standard paradigm. The resulting models will be an improvement and policies based on them may do better, but they too are likely to fail. Nothing less than a paradigm shift will do. But a new paradigm, I believe, is within our grasp: the intellectual building blocks are there and the Institute for New Economic Thinking is providing a framework for bringing the diverse group of scholars striving to create this new paradigm together. What is at stake, of course, is more than just the credibility of the economics profession or that of the policymakers who rely on their ideas: it is the stability and prosperity of our economies. ' (Stiglitz, 2010a) About the reliance of policymakers upon the ideas of economists there has always been a lot of wishful thinking: 'Late in life, moreover, he [Napoleon] claimed that he had always believed that if an empire were made of granite the ideas of economists, if listened to, would suffice to reduce it to dust.' (Viner, 1963 p. 1); see also (Gerschenkron, 1969) The credibility of economic advice ultimately rests on the credibility of the basic premises of pure theory: 'If a professional group regards itself a having a message to deliver to others than its own members and makes any public claims in that respect, it thereby gives others the right to scrutinize the methods whereby that message was discovered, including the principles, or possibly prejudices, followed in choosing premises. They continue to do so. Cunningham in 1891 remarked that in the choice of premises "it is not always easy to tell when a professor of the dismal science is making a joke" and I suspect that Cunningham meant that if the professor was not joking, then he was making a fool of himself.' (Viner, 1963 p. 12) 'A scientific observer or reasoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for practice. His part is only to show that certain consequences follow from certain causes, and that to obtain certain ends, certain means are the most effectual. Whether the ends themselves are such as ought to be pursued, and if so, in what cases and to how great a length, it is no part of his business as a cultivator of science to decide, and science alone will never qualify him for the decision.' (Mill, 2006 (Mill, /1843 location of any share on the firmament of the Stock Exchange Market, whether tomorrow or one year from now, by solving certain equations that govern the motion of that market. Undoubtedly, the essence of that dream must still be nursed in the subconscious of many modern economists. The role of such a hope in the founding of the Cowles Commission is evidenced by several articles in the early volumes of Econometrica. (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979 pp. 319-320) 22 'The concept of natural selection gave Darwin the greatest difficulty. True to the principles of mechanistic determinism, which like others of his generation he thought to be the essence of science, Darwin rejected Lamarck's view (…). Darwin's persistence on this point produced finally not simply reinforcement of the mechanistic philosophy, but a fundamentally altered concept of order in nature. ' (Bannister, 1979 p. 26) 23 The adoption of the Darwinian metaphor is not intended: 'The role of metaphors in science is not well understood. Indeed the role of metaphors is still controversial on its home ground in language. It should be no surprise that when we metaphorically or otherwise extend literary metaphor to scientific practice, matters become quickly obscure. Darwin's notion of blind variation and natural selection has been one of the most tempting of metaphors in the social sciences. Whether it has been a source of fruitful stimulation is debatable. ' (Rosenberg, 1994 pp. 407-408) , for a more general impact of Darwin's main ideas see (Mayr, 1995) 24 Variety, diversity, heterogeneity has a biological, cultural, economic, and political dimension: 'Darwin, by contrast, introduced an entirely new way of thinking, when he maintained that species are not classes but variable populations composed of uniquely different individuals. One can almost say that this view is an upside down version of the axioms of essentialism. At this view is an upside down version of the axioms of essentialism. For Darwin the real thing in nature was the uniqueness of the individual, while the mean value of the population was only an abstraction. For the essentialist on the other hand, the idea was the only thing that was real, and variation simply an "error" or "accident."' (Mayr, 1991 p. 127) 'Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another: they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable; and although at every period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road, their attempts to thwart each other's development have rarely had any permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good which the others have offered. ' (Mill, 1998 ' (Mill, /1859 25 'Since the time when Adam Smith's friend David Hume observed that there was no logical justification for the common belief that much of our empirical knowledge was based on inductive proof (…), methodologists and philosophers have been plagued with what they call the 'Problem of Induction'. The paradigmatic instance of the Problem of Induction is the realization that we cannot provide an inductive proof that 'the sun will rise tomorrow'. (…) Several writers have claimed to have solved this famous problem (…) -which is quite surprising, since it is impossible to solve.' (Boland, 2003 p. 13) 'In Adam Smith's time, inductive generalization was the paradigm of rational thinking; Newton's physics was the paradigm of inductive generalization.' (Boland, 2003 pp. 14, 15) 26 'The sneering and name calling and good-guy identifying and horrified-viewing-withalarm that characterize methodological discourse fit a program of goodness. We berate and banish the criminal, the bad person. The rules of the game give us way of classifying scholars as citizens or as thought criminals.' (McCloskey, 1988 p. 249) 27 In a certain sense all economic analysis is, of course, partial analysis: 'Economic data are not ultimate data, like the speed of light in physics. Rather they are provisional in nature. This is expressed by means of the ceteris paribus clause. All factors not explicitly considered as variables are assumed to be fixed within an argument. This clause is used, explicitly or implicitly, throughout economics. The ceteris paribus clause is particularly restrictive in those cases where only a narrowly limited issue is analysed, such as price formation in a single market. Effects on other markets, and possible repercussions, are excluded. Price changes in one market might lead to price changes in other markets, however, and these work back on the market under consideration The assumption that all other prices are given is certainly wrong here. But the same reservation applies also to more comprehensive theories, since these have to presuppose data, too, and repercussions of the processes under study on the, data of the analysis cannot be excluded, irrespective of how we try to delimit the problem! Economics is bound to perform partial analysis rather than total analysis: It considers phenomena in an economic system which is only a part of the wider complex and interdependent social system, and fixes its demarcations by means of the ceteris paribus clause. ' (Schlicht, 1985 p. 3), original emphasis 28 'Wer sich mit der Forschung beschäftigt hat, wird schwerlich glauben, daß die Entdeckungen nach dem Aristotelischen oder Bacon'schen Schema der Induktion (…) zustande kommen. Da wäre ja das Entdecken ein behagliches Handwerk. Die Tatsachen, deren Erkenntnis eine Entdeckung vorstellt, werden vielmehr erschaut. ' Mach, quoted in (Schmiechen, 2009 pp. 197-198) 'This indicates that any attempt logically to derive the basic concepts and laws of mechanics from the ultimate data of experience is doomed to failure. If then it is the case that the axiomatic basis of theoretical physics cannot be an inference from experience, but must be free invention, have we any hope that we shall find the correct way?' (Einstein, 1934 pp. 166-167) 29 '(…) that those who are called practical men require specific experience, and argue wholly upwards from particular facts to a general conclusion; while those who are called theorists aim at embracing a wider field of experience, and, having argued upwards from particular facts to a general principle including a much wider range than that of the question under discussion, then argue downwards from that general principle to a variety of specific conclusions. ' (Mill, 2004 ' (Mill, /1844 'Since, therefore, it is vain to hope that truth can be arrived at, either in Political Economy or in any other department of the social science, while we look at the facts in the concrete, clothed in all the complexity with which nature has surrounded them, and endeavour to elicit a general law by a process of induction from a comparison of details; there remains no other method than the à priori one, or that of "abstract speculation." ' (Mill, 2004 ' (Mill, /1844 30 'The Principia begins with an idealized world, a simple mental construct, a "system" of a single mathematical particle and a centrally directed force in a mathematical space. Under these idealized conditions, Newton freely develops the mathematical consequences of the laws of motion that are the axioms of the Principia. At a later stage, after contrasting this ideal world with the world of physics, he will add further conditions to his intellectual construct -for example, by introducing a second body that will interact with the first one and then exploring further mathematical consequences. (…) In this way he can approach by stages nearer and nearer to the condition of the world of experiment and observation, introducing bodies of different shapes and composition and finally bodies moving in variant types of resistant mediums rather than in free space. ' (Cohen, 1994 p. 77) As true epigones the social scientists borrowed a lot from Newton but did not grasp the 'Newtonian style'. By consequence it cannot be said that Newton's method has failed in the social sciences. It has never been applied properly but was soon made redundant by Hamilton's reformulation of rational mechanics (Cohen, 1994 pp. 71-75) .The crucial point of the Newtonian style is the undissolvable combination of axiomatics and empiricism. Despite heavy borrowing, these essential points never got across: 'Did anyone ever attempt to found a system of social science or economics on the level of identity with Newtonian rational mechanics or the Newtonian system of the world? In my research I have never found such an example. (…) In the Newtonian system, furthermore, there is no equilibrium, no balancing of contrary forces as in the case of a lever.' (Cohen, 1994 p. 61) 31 'Arithmomorphic models, to repeat, are indispensable in economics, no less than in other scientific domains. That does not mean also that they can do all there is to be done in economics. ' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971 p. 341) 32 '(…) we shall be concerned with a particular, but very important, class of economic theories, namely those where the theoretical model consists of a system of (ordinary or functional) equations between certain economic variables. A few remarks may be made as to the common sense of this type of economic theory. Broadly speaking, we may classify such quantitative economic relations in the three groups: I. Definitional identities, II. Technical relations, III. Relations describing economic action.
